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A Theoretical Postscript:
Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller
T o A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT, the question of how to treat the
lost-volume seller presents a problem in economics. The argu-
ments asserted for providing him a remedy in excess of the tradi-
tional contract-price-minus-market-price damages are anchored to
the peculiar economic characteristics of his market, characteristics
which cause him theoretically to "lose" a sale whenever one of his
buyers breaches. Briefly stated, these critical characteristics are (1)
a limited number of potential buyers, each of whom will eventually
buy from the seller if he can supply them, and (2) a present capac-
ity to supply all of these potential buyers at the going price.
Before a rule of law is fashioned to deal specifically with the
lost-volume seller's problem, a preliminary inquiry should be made
into the actual frequency of the economic conditions which would
bring this particular market phenomenon about. Professor Shanker
argues that an economic analysis of the problem casts considerable
doubt on whether the theoretical lost-volume seller ever exists in
a real world full of efficient and competitive merchants.1 But the
application of economics goes beyond the determination whether the
troubled lost-volume seller postulated by the commentators has a
real world counterpart. Since the damages formula of Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-708(2) relies upon standards like "as
good a position as performance would have done" and "profit (in-
cluding reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made
from full performance, '12 measuring damages under this section re-
quires a good hard look at the economics of the lost-volume seller's
operations. To provide the reader with a better analytical grasp
on these problems, this Postscript will discuss some of the basic
economic models which could be used to assess the situation of the
lost-volume seller.
I. THE PURE-COMPETITION MODEL
A. Cost Structure
Over the long run each producer has considerable latitude in
1 Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One Profit
for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 697, 704 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Shanker].
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708(2).
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choosing the combination of production inputs (such as plant capac-
ity, equipment, and laborers) that he will utilize in manufacturing
products. But in the short run, which is the period over which
the producer will "lose" a sale if he is to lose one, his latitude
is considerably decreased. To expand the rate of production in the
short run, the producer's only option may be to increase the size
of his work force or the amount of overtime worked.
As the producer continues to expand his rate of output, by in-
creasing the size of his work force, for example, without correspond-
ing increases in his plant or equipment, he will eventually reach
a point where overall efficiency is sacrificed, where the increase in
total product brought about by each new worker gets smaller and
smaller. This is the phenomenon of "diminishing marginal re-
turns" to which Professor Shanker refers. Translated into terms
of dollar expenditures, it means that as output is increased beyond
the point of diminishing marginal product, if V represents the dol-
lar amount of wages paid to each worker, for each additional W ex-
pended the resulting addition to total output constantly decreases.
Phrased differently, the marginal cost of producing each additional
unit of output increases. What results is a marginal cost (MC)
curve similar to the one depicted in figure 1. The horizontal axis
measures flow of output, in terms of units produced over a given
time period. The vertical axis measures costs per unit. At the level
represented by point Qa, diminishing marginal returns set in. The
curve designated AFC represents the average fixed costs (such as
interest payments, depreciation on plant and equipment, and a rea-
sonable amount of total profit) 4 per unit of output and can be used
as an approximation for "reasonable overhead" as used in section
2-708(2). At low levels of output, this curve slopes sharply down-
3 Shanker 705 & n.31.
4 In strict economic usage, the term "cost" includes not only expenses in the ordi-
nary accounting sense but also a "normal profit," a return sufficient to keep the owner's
funds invested in the business. This normal profit is treated as a component of
fixed costs. Returns in excess of this amount, as measured by total sales revenue
minus total economic "cost," are termed "supernormal profits." See D. WATsON,
PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 148-49 (2d ed. 1968). As used in section 2-708(2),
"profit" is meant to include total profit per unit - the normal return as well as
any supernormal one. Since unit price minus per unit total cost, when cost is used
in the economic sense, equals supernormal profits only, this formula will understate
the amount of profit for purposes of section 2-708(2). This problem is only a tempo-
rary one, however. When average fixed costs are added to per unit supernormal profits
to arrive at the statutory "profit (including reasonable overhead)," per unit normal
profit is included in the total since it is a component of fixed costs. When the
word "profit" is used in this Postscript, unless otherwise specified, it refers to super-
normal profit only and does not represent the entire return to the producer.
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ward as fixed costs are divided among an increasing number of
units; as output increases this slope tapers off significantly. The
AVC curve signifies the average variable cost incurred in producing
a given level of output. Average variable cost initially decreases,
reflecting the low marginal cost of making additions to total output.
The curve continues to decline even after the point of diminishing
marginal returns is reached and up until the point Q2 where average
cost is no longer in excess of marginal cost. The average total
cost (ATC) curve represents the sum of average fixed costs and
average variable costs. Like the AVC curve, the ATC curve has its
minimum point at its intersection with the MC curve.'
B. Determination of the Optimal Level of Output
An industry is said to embody pure competition when it is com-
prised of numerous firms producing a standardized product. The
critical element is that each producer's share of the total output of
the industry is so insignificant that, in his view, his decisions as
to the amount of output to produce and ultimately to sell have
no impact upon the price he is to receive for his goods. A good
5 For a mathematical discussion of the characteristics of these shortrun cost curves
see id. at 226-27.
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example is the small grain farmer. The price to be paid for his
grain is determined by the aggregate supply and demand for the
entire industry's product. At this market price, the individual grain
farmer believes he can sell as much (or as little) output as he
chooses to produce. In other words, the demand curve for the prod-
uct of each individual farmer is horizontal, as represented in figure
2, with price equal to the prevailing market price P*.
FIGURE 2
DEMAND CURVE FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRM
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Demand for Firm's Output in Units
The analysis of how much output an individual firm will decide
to produce over a given period rests on the assumption that the
firm will make its output decisions with the objective of maximizing
the total amount of profits it expects to receive.6 Because total prof-
its are equal to total revenues minus total costs (fixed and variable),'
increasing output results in increased profits only so long as the
increment in total revenue derived from selling each additional unit
exceeds the increment in total costs incurred in manufacturing it.
Consequently, the firm should expand its production to the point
where the marginal revenue from manufacturing a new unit is no
longer greater than the marginal cost, or, phrased differently, to the
point where marginal profit is reduced to zero.
6 For a discussion of the validity of the profit-maximization assumption as a
tool for analyzing business behavior see R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCtURE,
CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 2-6 (2d ed. 1967).
7 More precisely, total revenues minus total costs equal total supernormal profits.
This distinction does not affect the profit-maximization analysis. Since the amount
of normal profit is constant, and therefore does not vary with the level of output,
the point where supernormal profits are at a maximum will also be the point where
total profits are at a maximum.
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For the firm operating under pure competition, like the small
grain farmer, the marginal revenue derived from selling each unit
is constant. Since the firm can sell as many units as it pleases at
the going market price, the marginal revenue of the nth unit as
well as the marginal revenue of the first unit is equal to that market
price. To maximize its profits the firm should therefore produce
that level of output where the marginal cost of the last unit pro-
duced equals the going market price. This is illustrated in figure
3. Marginal revenue (MR) is equal to P*, the going market price,
at all levels of output. The MC curve is taken from figure 1. The
MP curve, signifying marginal profits, represents the difference be-
tween MR and MC at each level of output. The TP curve is total
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profit, which can be viewed as cumulated marginal profit. From
the graph it can be seen that the firm will maximize its total profits
by producing Q units, which is the output level at which MP = 0
and the MC curve intersects the MR curve.
This pure-competition model, while providing a useful heuristic
for analyzing the firm's production decisions, does not accurately de-
pict the situation which has been postulated as facing the lost-vol;
ume seller. In pure competition, there can never be a "lost" sale,
since by definition the firm can dispose of whatever output it pro-
duces at the going market price. If the lost-volume seller is to
have any existence whatsoever it must be in an industry where the
market and the market price is somewhat sensitive to the quantity
of product which the seller is marketing. But after these problems
with applying the model have been recognized, the pure-competition
framework still sheds light on some of the issues critical to the lost-
volume problem.
One of these issues is the notion, criticized by Professor
Shanker,8 that many sellers have an unlimited capacity to supply
their product at the market price. If the profit-maximization hy-
pothesis has validity, it follows that a firm with price and cost curves
similar to those depicted in figure 3 will decide to produce and sell
Q units and Q units only, notwithstanding the fact that it can sell
more and notwithstanding the fact that it possesses the physical ca-
pacity to produce more. While the hypothetical firm could expand
its rate of production to sell Q + 1 units in a given period, to
do so would prove unprofitable. The clear result of this reasoning
is that in the event one of the firm's buyers breaches a sales contract,
and the firm goes ahead and produces and sells Q units over the
time period in question, as it should in order to maximize its total
profits, the firm should not be entitled to recover a profit from the
breaching buyer. Even if the firm could somehow prove that the
buyer's breach caused it to "lose" the sale of what would have been
the (Q + 1)th unit, the firm should not recover the profits from
the (Q + 1)th sale, because, for profitability reasons, the (Q + 1)th
sale would never have been actually made.
The inequity of allowing the pure-competition firm to use sec-
tion 2-708(2) to collect an extra profit for the (Q + 1)th sale
is demonstrated in figure 4. In that diagram, C equals the average
total cost of producing Q units. Since it is assumed that the industry
in which the firm is operating is in longrun equilibrium, C is equal
8 Shanker 704-05.
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to the price P*, and the only profit which the firm earns is its
normal profitY Operating at its profit-maximization point Q, where
MC equals MR, the firm has average variable costs equal to V,
and generates total revenues (P* X Q) which exceed total variable
costs by an amount sufficient to pay the firm's fixed costs and return
to the firm a normal profit. Had the firm actually sold and been
forced to produce Q + 1 units, this total excess would have been
decreased by the amount by which the marginal cost of producing
the (Q + 1)th unit exceeds P*. Moreover, because ATC is greater
than P* at Q + 1, the (Q + 1)th sale would have reduced the
firm's total profits below a normal rate of return.
The clear implication of the preceeding analysis is that the firm
should not be allowed to recover a profit because it did not make
9 In theory, if P* were greater than average total costs for the firms in the industry
and these firms were therefore earning supernormal profits, new firms would be lured
into the industry. Investors would be induced to shift their capital out of industries
where only a normal return could be earned and into the industry which offered
the prospect of supernormal profits. As these new firms entered, their additions to
the industry's present output would cause supply to exceed demand and produce a
reduction in price. This reduction would continue until the price fell to the level
of average total costs. When this occurs, profits in the industry would be reduced
to a normal return and outside firms would no longer be encouraged to enter. Con-
sequently, longrun equilibrium is achieved in an industry only when the firms compris-
ing the industry are earning only a normal return. See P. TREscoTr, THE LOGIC
OF THE PRICE SYSTEM 195-96 (1970). While the analysis that follows will assume
that the industry is in longrun equilibrium, this assumption is not critical to the
reasoning. The same conclusions would follow even if the firm were in a disequilib-
rium situation.
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the (Q + 1)th sale. But unfortunately for the breaching buyer,
a court of law, if presented with this case and persuaded that the
firm "lost" a sale because of the buyer's breach, is unlikely to em-
ploy this economically correct marginal-profit analysis. Instead, it
would probably estimate the profit that was foregone on the lost
sale by the average profit and contribution to overhead earned by
the firm on the sales it did make. If this is the case, the firm
will be awarded damages in the amount of P - V, an undeserved
recovery, since had the sale in fact occurred, the firm would have
lost money.
Admittedly, it does not follow from the preceeding discussion
that every sale which a profit-maximizing firm loses would actually
have caused a reduction in total profits if it had been carried out.
Had the hypothetical firm been able to produce and sell only Q - 2
units because of breaching buyers, then, since the firm could profit-
ably have made the Qth and (Q - 1) th sales if it had had the
opportunity, it could correctly be said that the firm was deprived
of a profit.10 The important point, though, is that even if the firm
did lose a sale and profit, the recovery it could receive under section
2-708(2) is likely to prove excessive. Applying that Code section
to the firm described in figure 4, a court would probably look at
the amount by which price exceeds average variable costs and incor-
rectly conclude that each additional unit of output would make a
healthy contribution to profit and overhead. Recognizing that court
and counsel lack the tools and the data to conduct the sort of mar-
ginal cost and revenue analysis employed in the preceding discussion
on a case-by-case basis, the more reasonable working presumption
is that the firm is attempting to maximize its profits and is therefore
operating at a level of output where the high marginal cost of
producing the lost-sale units would have offset most of the marginal
revenue that would have been received had the buyers not breached,
and in fact may have exceeded it.
II. THE MONOPOLY MODEL
The preceding analysis has focused upon the plight of the lost-
volume seller operating in a purely competitive industry. But fre-
10 If Q - 1 units could be sold then the firm may or may not have lost some
profits depending upon the circumstances. The profit-maximization point Q is defined
as the highest level of output at which marginal cost does not exceed marginal
revenue. At Q it could be that marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal and
therefore that production of the Qth unit does not produce an increase in total profits.
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quent in the American economy are industries where factors like
market concentration, product differentiation, or barriers to entry
make the pure-competition model inapplicable." Economists clas-
sify these industries under the headings of monopolistic competition,
oligopoly, and pure monopoly. Regardless of the label applied,
these industries share the characteristic that the sellers base their
output decisions upon the realization that, unlike firms in pure com-
petition, they cannot dispose of an unlimited amount of output at
the going market price. To increase the number of units sold, the
firm must be willing to accept a decrease in price.
To evaluate the lost-volume seller's situation in these industries
where the amount the firm sells has an impact on the price it will
receive, the polar case of imperfect competition, pure monpoly, will
be considered. Pure monopoly exists where one firm is the only
producer of a good or service that has no close substitutes;12 firm
and industry are identical. Thus, in pure monopoly, the traditional
downward-sloping demand curve for the industry's product, where
the quantity of units demanded increases as price goes down, is the
demand curve faced by the individual firm. In figure 5 this monop-
olist's demand curve is labelled D. The MR curve represents mar-
ginal revenue. In pure competition, because the firm could receive
the going market price for each new unit sold, marginal revenue
equalled price for every unit of output. For the monopolist, on
the other hand, increasing sales requires reducing the price. As
a consequence, the additions to revenue that result from selling addi-
tional units are partially offset by the reduction in overall price
which is necessary to achieve the new level of sales volume. For
example, using the curves in figure 5, if output is increased by one
unit from Q, to Q2, total revenue will be increased by P2, but since
the unit price must be reduced to generate the increased sales, the
increase in total revenue must be netted against a reduction in the
amount of (P1 - P,) X Qi. The magnitude of the net increase
is C, the marginal revenue of the Q2th unit. Given a linear demand
curve as depicted in figure 5, the marginal revenue curve is also
linear and slopes downward at a rate twice that of demand. 13
Like the firm operating in pure competition, the monopolist
makes his output decisions with the objective of maximizing profits
11 For a quantitative study of the market structures which exist in the American
economy see C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 24-43 (1965).
12 D. WATSON, supra note 4, at 304-05.
13 For a mathematical derivation of the relationship between the D and MR curves
see D. WATSON, supra note 4, at 339.
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FIGURE 5
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and finds that his profits are maximized at the point where the mar-
ginal cost of the last unit produced equals its marginal revenue.
As indicated in figure 6, the monopolist faces cost curves very simi-
lar to those confronting the purely competitive firm. He will oper-
ate in a range of output where his marginal costs are rising and
will attempt to produce at the specific point Qi where MC intersects
MR. This level of output in turn determines the market price P1
since the monopolist's demand curve dictates the price at which any
given quantity of output can be sold. At this combination of price
and output, the monopolist will receive an average supernormal
profit per unit equal to P1 - C.
To apply this theoretical model to the problem of the lost-vol-
ume seller, assume that the curves contained in figure 7 represent
Boeing's production and sale of 747's in the White and Summers
hypothetical' 4 to which both Mr. Schlosser and Professor Shanker
14 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-13, at 234-35 (1972).
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allude. In conformity with the facts used in the hypothetical, Qi
would be equal to 100 planes per year and P1 would be equal to
$20 million. At first blush, it may appear that the hypothetical
Boeing Corporation depicted in figure 6 qualifies as a lost-volume
seller, since at a price of $20 million per plane, Boeing's market
is comprised of 100 and only 100 buyers. If one of those buyers
breaches, Boeing will only be able to sell 99 planes at the $20
million price. But if the demand curve in figure 6 accurately repre-
sents Boeing's situation, the firm need not lose a sale. While it
may have only 100 buyers at the $20 million price, if it reduces
the price of the plane, the number of buyers will be increased. Even-
tually some price level should be reached that will be low enough
to induce the 101st buyer to purchase. In figure 7a this level is
postulated as being $17 million. The only true lost-volume situa-
tion is that represented in figure 7b - where the demand curve
suddenly breaks off and becomes vertical so that there is no price
at which one more sale can be made. While this occurrence is
theoretically possible, it seems far more plausible that the demand
for 747's is similar to the curve in figure 7a, that there exist several
potential purchasers of the 747 whose volume of business is not
A THEORETICAL POSTSCRIPT
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sufficiently great to warrant a $20 million outlay for the plane but
who would find the investment economically feasible if the price
of the plane were significantly lower.
So long as there is some price, no matter how low, at which
these marginal purchasers will find it worthwhile to buy the plane
which was the subject of the breached contract, there is no lost
sale.' 5 The section 2-708 (2) remedy is unnecessary because the pro-
visions of section 2-706 which give the seller damages in the
amount of the difference between the contract price and the resale
price will be adequate to redress fully the seller's loss. The only,
practical problem in this example is assuring that in the calculation
of damages for section 2-706 the "resale" is viewed as being the
one low sale for $17 million and not one of the 99 original sales
for $20 million.
There could, however, be cases where the section 2-706 resale
remedy does not work this satisfactorily. For example, suppose that
the goods were more fungible than the Boeing 747 and that the
seller, after correctly deciding that his profits would be maximized
if he produced 100 units and sold them for $20 each, made a con-
tract to sell the first 10 units to X. The seller gods ahead and
produces 100 units, and then X refuses to accept the goods. It
is questionable whether the seller, knowing that over the period
in question he will now have only 90 other buyers at the $20 price,
could continue to offer the goods for $20 on this original 90, but
upon finding a buyer who would be willing to buy the 10 remaining
units for $19, drop the price for that sale only and then immediately
raise it back to $20.16 Instead, the seller might have to offer all
100 units at the $19 price.
15 Mr. Schlosser appears to concede that in many instances the seller may avoid
losing a sale by lowering his price, but adds that the lost-volume phenomenon will
still occur where standard-priced goods are involved. Schlosser, Construing UCC Sec-
tion 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume Seller, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 686,
688-89 & n.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schlosser), citing Harris, A Radical Restate-
ment of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared,
18 STAN. L. REv. 66, 96 (1965). The concept of standard-priced goods is discussed
at text accompanying note 19 infra.
16 At first appearance it might seem that the seller could carry out the ploy dis-
cussed in the text by pricing his goods at $20 per unit, waiting until he had no
more buyers at this price (which would be after the 90th unit was sold), and then
gradually reducing his price until the remaining units were sold. But it must be
remembered that the concept of demand used here represents an ongoing flow of
demand, not a fixed one-time demand for a particular stock of goods. The postulated
demand for the seller's product is 100 units per year. In other words, he should
be able to sell one unit every 3.65 days. By reducing his price he might be able
to increase this rate. In view of this nature of the seller's demand, it would appear
that the only way for the seller to achieve this price-discrimination strategy would
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Figure 8 provides a framework for analyzing this seller's situa-
tion. Initially, the seller ascertains that he can maximize profits
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be by (1) publicly offering the goods for $20, (2) correctly ascertaining that he could
sell the additional 10 units if he reduced his price to $19, and then (3) subtlely
transmitting the news to the marketplace that although the posted price of the goods
was $20 he might be willing to drop his price to $19. Then, when a buyer appears,
the seller must correctly assess whether he is willing to buy for $20 or not. If
he is, he pays $20; if not, the seller drops his price to $19 for that sale only. Even
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by producing 100 units and selling them for $20 per unit. At
this level of output he anticipates total revenues of $2,000 and total
variable cost of $600 ($6 average variable cost multiplied by 100.
units), which leaves a $1,400 contribution to fixed costs and profit.
But after X breaches, the only way the seller can dispose of all
100 units is by lowering his price to $19.
It appears therefore that once X breaches, the seller has two
options. He can take the 10 units representing the breached sale
off the market, offer for sale the other 90 units only, and by these
actions keep his price at $20. Alternatively, he could sell all 100
units at $19." r Because the seller has already manufactured all 100
units, his fixed and variable costs will not change, regardless of the
course of action he chooses. The only difference will be in total
revenue. Consequently, ignoring for the moment the differences
in damages remedies that might result from the two alterantives,
the seller's choice is likely to be dictated by the shape and slope
of his demand curve. If he withholds the 10 units he can receive
$1,800 (90 units at $20). By selling all 100 he can increase his
total revenue by $100 (100 units at $19), but only so long as his
demand curve is that represented by curve D. If, on the other hand,
curve D' was the more accurate portrayal of the demand curve the
seller faces, the only way in which he could dispose of all 100 units
is by dropping his price to $17.50. In this case, expanding sales
would result in a $50 decrease in total revenues (100 units at $17.50).
It is in this second hypothetical (where the seller faces demand
curve D') that a real-world manifestation of the lost-volume phe-
nomenon can finally be found. But it is not because the seller
cannot sell his product beyond a limited group of buyers as postu-
lated by the commentators and depicted in figure 7b; rather, it re-
sults from the impact of the price reductions necessary to sell all
his output. If, as is the case in the second hypothetical, the magni-
tude of the necessary price reductions in effect precludes the seller
from reselling the 10 units which were the subject of the breach,
then contract-price-minus-market-price damages are not sufficient. In
this situation the seller should be entitled to recover the profit lost
assuming that this pricing scheme could be legally implemented under the antitrust
laws, it seems highly doubtful that the seller would possess the omniscience to carry
it out effectively.
17 The seller could, of course, choose to sell only part of the extra 10 units to
make the total sold, say, 93 units. In some cases this may be the optimal decision.
The hypotheticals used here are structured so that the seller achieves optimality by
selling all or selling none, but the ensuing analysis applies with equal force to cases
where profits are maximized by selling part.
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on the breached sale under section 2-708(2). Under this section
he can recover profit including reasonable overhead in the amount
of $140, which represents price minus average variable cost on the
10 unsold units as depicted in figure 8. When this recovery is
added to the $1,260 the seller received from the 90 units he sold,
the total corresponds to what the seller would have received without
the breach, $1,400. Unfortunately, in attempting to use section
2-708(2) the seller will encounter all the problems discussed in the
preceeding Comments.18  For example, if the breached sale is for
the first 10 units, and the seller resells these units to buyers who
would otherwise have purchased units 11 through 20, then, using
the literal reading of section 2-708(2), advocated by Professor
Shanker, the entire amount of the resale proceeds would be sub-
tracted from the recovery so that the seller will recover zero dam-
ages even though he ends up with 10 units which he cannot sell.
If, by using the arguments advanced by the various commenta-
tors, section 2-708 (2) can be interpreted to give an action for profits
to the monopolist described above who must withhold some units
of output to keep his prices at a reasonable level, then the remedies
available to the other class of monopolists, those who decide to re-
duce prices and sell all their output, should be reconsidered. For
example, the seller facing demand curve D in figure 8, had there
been no breach, would have had $2,000 in total revenues and a
$1,400 contribution to fixed costs and profit. After the breach, if
he sells his entire output at $19, he will have revenues of $1,900
plus a section 2-708(1) remedy for $10 (contract price [$20] minus
market price [$19] on the 10 units). Since hi's total variable costs
remain unchanged, the seller has available for fixed costs and profits
only $1,310. He ends up in a worse position than the seller who
withheld output since that seller netted the full $1,400. This
scheme of remedies provides an inducement for the monopolist to
keep his goods off the market and afterwards argue that a resale
was economically infeasible because of the price reductions neces-
sary. The more desirable remedy from a policy standpoint would
seem to be one which encourages the seller to place all his output
on the open market and thereby fulfill as much of the existing de-
mand for his product as is possible. After the seller has sold all
that he has produced, he can then go against the breaching buyer
for any difference in total profits caused by the breach. In the hypo-
thetical, this would give the seller an action for the $100 difference.
18 Shanker 697-700; Schlosser 689-91.
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(The difference will be $100 instead of $90 because when the pur-
chaser elects to sue under section 2-708(2), he loses his section
2-708(1) remedy.)
Whether this remedy can be implemented within the present
strictures of section 2-708(2) is certainly open to question. Assum-
ing that the section is available, the monopolist's remedy will be
limited to the profit plus overhead he could have earned on the
breached sale. It is possible that to dispose of all his output the
seller would have to lower his price by such an amount that the
loss in overall revenue would exceed the profit-plus-overhead mea-
sure. (This would be the case, for instance, if the seller with de-
mand curve D' decided to drop his price to $17.50 in order to
sell all his units). In this one group of cases it would appear better
for the seller to avoid excessive damages by keeping his prices at
their original level and then suing the buyer for the price under
section 2-709.
III. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
If the seller is operating in a market characterized by pure com-
petition, where there are numerous small sellers producing a stan-
dardized product, he cannot properly be viewed as "losing" a profit
as a result of one of his buyer's breaching a sales contract. First,
in pure competition, the seller can by definition dispose of as much
output at the going market price as he chooses to produce. Second,
even if the pure-competition seller was somehow forced to lose a
sale because of the breach, it is doubtful that the lost sale would
create an appreciable reduction in the seller's total profits. The rea-
son is that for any profit-maximizing firm (whether it is operating
in pure competition or not) the marginal sales, which are the ones
that will be "lost," will probably either produce only insignificant
amounts of profit or be unprofitable. Thus, in cases of pure compe-
tition, the need to fashion for the seller a lost-profits remedy does
not exist.
If the seller is operating under imperfect competition, on the
other hand, that is, if the structure of his market is either monopolis-
tic, oligopolistic, or monopolistically competitive, he cannot sell any,
amount of output he choses at the going price. But nonetheless
he should not "lose" a sale because of the buyer's breach, since he
has the power to lower his price to a level that will induce a new
buyer to purchase the unit. While his revenues will not be as great
as they would have been had the original buyer performed, the
A THEORETICAL POSTSCRIPT
seller does not forego a sale. This conclusion that the seller can
dispose of his entire output by reducing his price is subject to two
exceptions, however. One is the rare situation where there is some
finite limit on the number of potential buyers. The second and
probably more frequent exception is where the reduction in total
revenues that will result from decreasing the price exceeds the cor-
responding increase in revenues derived from selling the additional
unit. In these two instances the lost-volume phenomenon does in
fact exist in the real world and there follows the necessity to provide
the seller with an appropriate remedy under section 2-708 (2).
There may be one other economic situation, which may be
viewed as something of a hybrid of pure and imperfect competition,
where lost-volume theory will be applicable. This occurs when the
seller is not operating under pure competition, and therefore faces
a finite demand for his output at the going price, but for some
reason is prevented from reducing his price in order to increase his
sales volume. The "standard-priced" goods mentioned in the com-
ments to section 2-708(2)19 might fit into this category. But to
qualify for lost-volume treatment under this theory, it would seem
that the seller not onl-, must be prohibited from varying the market
price of his product but must also be precluded from offering any
other forms of inducement to potential buyers that might enable
the seller to dispose of his stock. And such a case of complete
seller inflexibility would appear unlikely.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708, Comment 2, discussed in Schlosser 688-
89 & nn.8-9.
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